Recent cases of hedge fund fraud have caused large losses for investors and have fueled the debate regarding the ability of regulators to oversee the industry. This paper proposes a set of performance flags, based on suspicious patterns in returns, as indicators of a heightened risk of fraud. We collect a sample of hedge funds charged with legal or regulatory violations and find that funds charged with misappropriation, overvaluation, misrepresentation, or Ponzi schemes trigger the performance flags at a higher frequency than other funds.
Existing studies examine the relation between regulatory or legal trouble and hedge fund operational risk, defined in Brown et al. (2008) as "the risks of failure of the internal operational, control, and accounting systems; failure of the compliance and internal audit systems; and failure of personnel oversight systems, that is, employee fraud and misconduct." Information regarding both violations and operational risk variables is typically gathered from SEC Form ADV filings. Brown et al. (2008) report strong evidence that "problem funds," those run by managers with prior violations, are significantly more likely to trigger operational flags such as integration of service providers or infrequent audits. Dimmock and Gerken (2009) find that funds that trigger operational flags are more likely to be charged with SEC violations in subsequent years.
An alternative approach to estimate the risk of fraud uses widely available hedge fund return data. Prior research, including Bollen and Pool (2009) and Agarwal et al. (2010) , has uncovered evidence that some managers purposefully misreport returns, presumably in an effort to attract and maintain their investor base. Some examples of misreporting are extreme:
Gregoriou and Lhabitant (2009) describe how a Madoff feeder fund, Fairfield Sentry, reported only 10 months of losses in a 215 month history, suggesting that Madoff's reported returns were too good to be true. Motivated by these results, we derive a family of performance flags based on suspicious patterns in a fund's reported returns that are consistent with fraudulent activity. By their nature, performance flags can be checked quickly on large-scale databases using quantitative algorithms, suggesting that they may offer a low-cost approach to identifying funds with a heightened risk of fraud.
If performance flags help identify fraud risk, then the SEC could use them to help determine which funds to examine, in the same way that the IRS uses red flags in tax returns to determine which filers to audit. Cox et al. (2003) study determinants of SEC enforcement actions and find little evidence that objective, quantifiable predictors of fraud are associated with subsequent actions, suggesting that SEC enforcement activity is triggered by investor complaints and adverse press coverage. However, the SEC has been widely criticized for failing to recognize the Madoff Ponzi scheme earlier than it did, prompting reforms to its enforcement division, including an emphasis on risk-based screens to trigger examinations. 1 This paper examines whether hedge funds with a heightened risk of fraud can be identified ex-ante by the presence of one or more suspicious patterns in returns. We study 12 performance flags, each motivated by prior research. These include: (1) a discontinuity in the distribution of hedge fund returns, (2) three measures of low correlation between hedge fund returns and the returns of style factors, (3) serial correlation in hedge fund returns, (4) conditional serial correlation in hedge fund returns, and (5) a family of six data quality indicators. These data quality indicators include measures such as the percentage of negative returns, the percentage of repeat returns, and the number of returns exactly equal to zero. In each case we design an appropriate statistical test for significance using a range of analytic and simulation techniques.
To study the association between performance flags and the incidence of hedge fund fraud, we first construct a sample of funds that have been the subject of regulatory enforcement actions or investor lawsuits, which we label problem funds, following the terminology of Brown et al. (2008) . We then classify each problem fund as either a reporting violation or a trading violation based on the nature of the alleged offense. In no case is a fund charged with both types.
A reporting violation is defined as misappropriation, overvaluation, misrepresentation, or running a Ponzi scheme. These actions are deceitful and more likely to be reflected in patterns in 1 See www.sec.gov/spotlight/secpostmadoffreforms.htm.
self-reported returns than other offenses. A trading violation involves short sale rules, insider trading, or any other violation, none of which imply that reported returns are inaccurate.
We compare problem funds to all other funds in a broad sample drawn from the TASS and CISDM databases, which we label non problem funds. Nine of the 12 performance flags are triggered at a significantly higher rate for reporting violations than for non problem funds. Six of the flags have rejection frequencies over 40% in the sample of reporting violations, including a low correlation with style factor returns and too few negative returns. In contrast, none of the performance flags are triggered more often in the sample of trading violations. These results indicate that our returns-based indicators are naturally more informative for violations in which managers are attempting to deceive their investors.
We conduct a probit analysis to measure the relation between the performance flags and the incidence of violations in a multivariate setting. We include as one of the independent variables a proxy for operational risk based on Brown et al. (2009) . Several performance flags and the operational risk proxy are statistically and economically significant. This result indicates that the information contained in our collection of suspicious patterns in returns is complementary to the predictive power of operational risk measures. Using coefficient estimates from the probit, we estimate the conditional probability of a subsequent violation for each fund, and find that roughly 50% of the reporting violations feature a conditional probability that exceeds the 90 th percentile for non problem funds. This result illustrates how a regulator or institutional investor could use performance flags to construct a single metric for assessing the risk of subsequent trouble.
Our paper makes three main contributions. First, the hand-collected dataset of enforcement actions and lawsuits against hedge funds is a rich, natural laboratory for studying the behavior of fund managers. As mentioned previously, Brown et al. (2008) Second, we demonstrate for the first time a significant statistical association between a wide variety of suspicious patterns in returns and the incidence of fraudulent activity and other regulatory violations. While prior research documents the existence of anomalies in reported returns, our study offers a comprehensive analysis of the frequency with which they precede legal or regulatory trouble.
Third, our success in detecting the risk of fraud has important regulatory implications.
We show that targeting funds for examination using risk-based screens can be effective, since funds which trigger performance flags are much more likely to ultimately be charged with legal or regulatory violations. In the spirit of Becker (1968), anti-fraud provisions of the securities statutes are a stronger deterrent to unlawful behavior when the probability of getting caught is higher. Our results therefore complement the findings of Brown et al. (2008) and Dimmock and Gerken (2009) , who show that operational flags contain information related to the risk of fraud;
in total this evidence suggests that closer supervision of the hedge fund industry can be effective.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I we discuss the set of performance flags used in the study and provide implementation details. Section II describes the data, with special attention paid to the collection of fraud cases used in our study. Section III presents the results. Section IV offers concluding remarks.
I. Quantitative Screens for hedge fund fraud
This section describes the five categories of performance flags we use to indicate a heightened risk of fraud. Details of the statistical tests we use to determine whether the flag is triggered are available in an online appendix.
A. Discontinuity at zero
Hedge funds are sometimes described as absolute-return vehicles that strive to deliver positive returns regardless of market conditions, as in Waring and Siegel (2006) . Investors appear to value this property. As shown by Bollen and Pool (2009) and Agarwal et al. (2010) , hedge fund investors direct capital towards managers who have reported a higher number of positive monthly returns, even after controlling for the level of cumulative return. If managers are able to deliver mostly positive returns through skill, then counting the number of losses would be a reasonable way to identify ability. However, evidence suggests that loss-avoidance might be evidence of misreporting. Bollen and Pool (2009) show that the distribution of hedge fund returns is discontinuous at zero. The discontinuity disappears when returns are computed at the bimonthly frequency instead, indicating that some returns are inflated to avoid reporting losses, and that these overstatements are subsequently reversed. Thus, our first performance flag is triggered when the distribution of a hedge fund's reported returns features a significant discontinuity at zero. and Dichev (1997) . We count the number of return observations that fall in three adjacent bins, two to the left of zero and one to the right. Under the null hypothesis of a smooth distribution, the number of observations that fall in the middle bin should be approximately equal to the average of the surrounding two bins. We interpret a significant shortfall in the middle bin observations as evidence that returns have been purposefully rounded up.
B. Low correlation with other assets
One purported benefit of hedge fund investment is diversification due to a low correlation with standard asset classes. Furthermore, as argued by Sun et al. (2009) (5) a distribution of the last digit that rejects the null of uniform. We include in our study of data quality, in addition to the five data quality tests studied by Straumann (2008) , the percentage of fund returns that are negative, since if returns are simply fabrications, as in Ponzi schemes, then managers naturally will report few losses. While the six patterns described are not necessarily cause for concern, their presence could be an indicator of more harmful actions.
Critical values for three of the six data quality tests, the uniformity of the last digit, the number of returns equal to zero, and the percentage of negative returns, are obtainable analytically. As described by Straumann (2008) , the uniformity test compares the percentage of observations ending in each digit 0 through 9 to its expected value of 10% under the null of a uniform distribution, and aggregates these differences in a goodness-of-fit test statistic. A fund triggers the "Uniform" flag when the probability of a more extreme difference from the uniform distribution is less than 10%. A fund triggers the "# Zero" flag when the probability of generating the observed number of zero returns or more is less than 10%. A fund triggers the "% Negative" flag when the probability of generating the observed number of negative returns or fewer is less than 10%. Obtaining critical values for the other tests, the percentage of repeated returns, the maximum length of a repeated return string, and the number of pairs of repeated returns, is challenging, especially given the impact of rounding, and so we establish fund-specific critical values through Monte-Carlo simulation.
To develop intuition for the magnitudes of these tests, Table 1 shows two sets of percentiles of the six test statistics from 10,000 simulations. Panel A shows results for a 60 month history, which is the median history length of the funds in our sample. Returns are generated from a scaled t-distribution with excess kurtosis of 3, annual mean of 10% and volatility 15%, and reported to the nearest 0.0001%. Panel B shows results for a 120 month history, with returns that are generated from a scaled t-distribution with excess kurtosis of 3, annual mean of 5% and volatility of 10%, and reported to the nearest 0.1%. In panel A, the high precision of the reported returns, along with the assumed mean and volatility, imply an extremely low probability of observing a return exactly equal to zero, hence there is less than a 5% chance of observing any zeroes in a 60 month history. In panel B, the extra rounding, and changes to the mean and volatility, raise the probability of a zero return so that there is a 75% chance of observing at least one zero in a 120 month history. Similarly, the maximum string length and expected number of pairs of repeated returns are larger in panel B. Note in both panels that there is only about a 5% chance of observing less than one-third negative returns.
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II. Data
The hedge fund data used in our analysis are drawn from the Center for International
Securities and Derivatives Markets (CISDM) and the Lipper TASS (TASS) databases. The sample period is from January 1994 through December 2008. Returns are net of all management and performance-based fees. Both databases include live and defunct hedge funds, funds of funds, and commodity trading advisers. We focus on live and defunct individual hedge funds, 3 As mentioned previously, Gregoriou and Lhabitant (2009) describe how a Madoff feeder fund, Fairfield Sentry, reported only 10 months of losses in a 215 month history. Using the fund's sample mean and standard deviation, the probability of observing 10 or fewer negative returns is approximately 0.03%. Fairfield Sentry's reported returns have a monthly mean of 0.9% and a monthly volatility of 0.8%, which seems impossibly low. If we use instead a monthly volatility of 4.0%, which is approximately the average volatility in our sample, the probability of 10 or fewer negative returns in a series of 215 months is 6.5 × 10 -33 %.
since these constitute the vast majority of enforcement actions. A fund must have at least 24 contiguous monthly observations of returns that overlap with the sample period for the factor returns, January 1994 through September 2008, to be included in our analysis. 4 Some fund managers report returns to both databases, so we check for matches and delete duplicates. First, potential matched pairs are formed by examining the names of funds in the two databases. Since these potential matched pairs have names that are often not identical, though very similar, we then compute the correlation between the return series of each pair of funds. Pairs with correlation above 99% are deemed matches and the series with the shorter history is discarded.
We collect a set of 13 style factors that are used in the existing hedge fund literature to proxy for the trading strategies employed by hedge fund managers. These factors are drawn from Reserve's website. The Agarwal and Naik (2004) OTM index call and OTM index put factors, designed to capture non-linear exposure to equities generated by derivatives or dynamic trading, were provided by Vikas Agarwal. To estimate the factor model, we also require a risk-free rate, and for this we use the one month T-Bill rate from Kenneth French's website.
Our primary research question is whether funds with return series that trigger performance flags are more likely to be subsequently prosecuted by the SEC or the subject of investor lawsuits. 5 We hand collect information regarding claims of regulatory and legal violations from three types of sources.
First, we search the litigation section of the SEC's website using the keyword 'hedge fund.' The search uncovers 785 SEC documents, including administrative proceedings, litigation releases, and court complaints. From these we construct a sample of 167 unique prosecution cases involving 477 unique hedge funds. We validate this sample using a database of SEC examinations from a consultancy. The consultancy's database complements our website search because in a significant number of the cases the SEC document does not explicitly identify the fund as a hedge fund.
Second, we search the websites of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) for additional releases on regulatory violations by hedge funds, the majority of which overlap with the cases already examined. We also use the Stanford Law School's Securities Class Action Lawsuit Clearinghouse website to collect information on investor lawsuits against hedge funds. Our search sets 'industry classification' to 'financial.' We manually check the resulting 562 matches and find 14 new cases, several of which are lawsuits targeting funds associated with the Bernard Madoff scandal. Although the managers of these funds are not directly involved in fraudulent activities, the performance of these funds is directly connected to Madoff's Ponzi scheme. Therefore, we include them in our database. To complete our sample of Madoff-related funds, we use the list of Madoff victims assembled by the Wall Street Journal and find six additional cases involving 16 unique funds.
Third, we obtained a list of over 330 unique fraud cases involving over 528 unique funds from a leading due diligence firm. Most of these cases are captured in our sample of SEC and CFTC documents and, as a result, overlap with our previous list.
After merging the hedge fund cases, our final list contains 1,069 unique fund names.
These funds are associated with a wide range of fund problems, from relatively small regulatory violations, such as a failure to file proper documentation with the SEC, to much more serious offenses, such as misappropriation or a Ponzi scheme. We manually match our list of problem funds to our CISDM/TASS database, resulting in 340 matches. We were able to identify filing For each fund in our sample of 340 funds in the CISDM/TASS data that are the subject of legal or regulatory proceedings, we discard all returns observed after the filing date of proceedings against them, since managers may change their reporting behavior once proceedings have commenced. 6 We require 24 remaining observations, and 191 have sufficient return data to be in our final sample. We label these problem funds. The remaining 8,575 funds in our return database are labeled non problem funds.
For the majority of problem funds, the litigation releases provide sufficient detail, including a timeline, for a more granular categorization. Based on the description of events, we place the problem funds into seven categories: "misappropriation," "overvaluation,"
"misrepresentation," "Ponzi scheme," "short sale violation," "insider trading," and "other." We place funds in the "other" category if they do not fit any of the first six groups. Though an individual case often involves several different offences, we place each fund in a single category that best captures the primary reason for the charges, which generally corresponds to the most egregious offence. Not all of the violations involve fraud; for instance, some of our problem funds are charged with illegal short selling or trading on inside information. For these reasons we further separate our sample into two groups: funds which are charged with misappropriation, overvaluation, misrepresentation, or a Ponzi scheme, which we refer to as "reporting violations,"
and funds which are charged with only short sale violations, insider trading, or any other offence, which we refer to as "trading violations." One might expect that our performance flags will more successfully identify reporting violations, as these are related to the accuracy of reported returns. Table 2 lists the number of fraud cases, and associated funds in our final sample, which fall into each category. The totals exceed 340 and 191, respectively, because some funds are charged with multiple offenses. The proportion of cases in each category is similar in the full sample and the subset with sufficient return data, with the exception of Ponzi schemes. These constitute 19% of the full sample but only 9% of the funds with return data.
As shown in Getmanksy et al. (2004) , the returns of illiquid fund types often feature different time series properties than the returns of liquid fund types, including positive serial correlation. This result suggests that the opportunity for fraud may also vary across fund types;
hence we extract fund strategies from the CISDM and TASS databases. Table 3 lists 13 categories of styles created from the two databases, as well as the number of funds in each category, for non problem funds, problem funds, reporting violations, and trading violations.
There are problem funds in almost all styles, in rough proportion to the size of each style. Note that more than half of the trading violations are in the Equity Long/Short category, but only one third of the reporting violations are, consistent with the lack of discretion in valuation for equitybased funds. In contrast, of the 15 problem funds in the Fixed Income Arbitrage category, 14 are reporting violations. (2010), for example, find that prior-year return is negatively related to the probability of fund failure. Note though that in our sample the live funds' statistics are heavily influenced by their poor performance in 2008, whereas most defunct funds left the databases by then. Given the historic growth of the industry, any sample of live hedge funds will be largely populated by new funds; hence the average return of live funds will be heavily influenced by the most recent period.
More importantly, problem funds feature substantially higher average returns and Sharpe ratios than other funds. Overall, the problem funds deliver 1.02% per month versus 0.64% for all other funds. Sharpe ratios tell the same story, with the problem funds averaging 0.5165 versus 0.1353 for all other funds. The differences are statistically significant using a standard twosample t-test as indicated by the asterisks in Panel B. These results are perhaps no surprise as many problem funds are charged with overstating performance. All categories feature substantial excess kurtosis, consistent with option-like payoffs in the strategies they employ, motivating Fung and Hsieh (2001 , 2002 , 2004 to use baskets of traded options to mimic strategy returns.
However, the defunct problem funds have dramatically higher excess kurtosis than the defunct non problem funds, 13.2612 versus 3.9661. Furthermore, while live problem funds feature positive skewness of 0.5929 versus -0.6697 for live non problem funds, defunct problem funds feature negative skewness of -0.8430 versus -0.2045 for defunct non problem funds. These results suggest that when problem funds become defunct, they tend to feature large, negative returns relative to all other funds.
We also compute expected shortfall, defined as the average monthly return below the 5 th percentile of a fund's reported returns. Liang and Park (2010) find that downside risk measures, including expected shortfall, are a significant determinant of fund failure. In our sample, the live problem funds feature expected shortfall of -5.67% compared to -9.79% for live non problem funds. For live funds, then, the problem funds appear superior to the non problem funds. This result indicates that our sample of problem funds is different from a sample of funds that fail due financial reasons alone. For example, some of the problem funds report returns that may be too good to be true; hence the summary statistics will appear more attractive than non problem funds.
The last two columns of Table 4 reveal one other difference between the groups of funds:
the live problem funds feature less serial correlation than the live funds in the other two groups.
The average serial correlation coefficient is 0.1400 for live problem funds, for example, versus 0.2166 for live non problem funds. This result may seem counter intuitive because serial correlation could be driven by purposeful misreporting in an effort to dampen the perceived volatility of a fund. We explore this phenomenon in greater detail in the other panels of Table 4 , which show the results for reporting violations and trading violations separately.
In Panels C and E we report results for the reporting violations and trading violations, respectively, and in Panels D and F we report results for corresponding control groups. We construct the control groups to account for other determinants of performance by matching each problem fund with 10 non problem funds. First, for each problem fund, we determine potential controls by matching on live/defunct status, style, maximum assets under management, and time period. Funds are classified as equity if they are in the long/short equity or equity market neutral styles; equity (non-equity) problem funds are matched with equity (non-equity) non problem funds. The time periods of two funds match if their first dates are within 24 months of each other, and if their last dates are as well. Next, we compute pair-wise correlations with all potential matches, and pick the 10 funds with the highest correlation.
In Panels C and E both subsets of the problem funds feature higher Sharpe ratios than the funds in their respective control groups. However, the reporting violations have more extreme performance, with average Sharpe ratios of 0.8593 versus 0.1851 for their control group. The reporting violations also feature dramatic levels of negative skewness and excess kurtosis, completely driven by the defunct funds. With regards to serial correlation, the reporting violations are similar to their control group, whereas the trading violations feature significantly less serial correlation. One possible explanation for this result is that managers charged with trading violations are typically involved with insider trading or violating short-selling rules. As a consequence, their fund returns may be generated by capturing short-term profits more so than other funds, and as a result there is not the same type of mechanical serial correlation present that arises from conservatively marking illiquid positions to market.
These preliminary results show that the reported returns of problem funds exhibit pronounced differences relative to those of non problem funds. Further, those funds charged with reporting violations feature return distributions that are dramatically different from funds charged with trading violations. The next section determines whether they differ as well in their tendency to trigger performance flags.
III. Results
A. Frequency of performance flags
Our main results are displayed in Table 5 . Listed are the percentages of non problem funds, reporting violations, and trading violations that trigger each performance flag. Also listed are p-values of tests for a difference between the rejection rate of non problem funds and the other two groups. An ideal flag would be triggered for a high percentage of problem funds, thereby minimizing Type I error, and a low percentage of non problem funds, resulting in a low Type II error as well. As described in Section II, our tests are established with a 10% significance level, so that the expected rejection rate for a sample of funds which report returns accurately is 10%. Turning next to the funds with reporting violations, the rejection rates are substantially higher than the non problem funds in nine of the 12 performance flags, and in six cases the rejection rate is above 40%. The biggest difference between the rejection rates of non problem funds and reporting violations is in the Maxrsq flag, which is triggered in 54.4% of reporting violations versus 25.5% of non problem funds, followed by the Kink flag, which is triggered in 43.0% of the reporting violations and only 17.3% of the non problem funds. Thus funds with returns that are unexplained by style factors, or return distributions with a pronounced discontinuity at zero, are much more likely to be engaged in activity resulting in a reporting violation than other funds. This result suggests that performance flags may be used to identify funds with higher risk of fraud.
Other performance flags are triggered at a higher rate for the reporting violations than non problem funds, including the % Negative, # Pairs, and String flags. The highest rejection rate of the other flags is 60.8% for the % Repeat flag, compared to 37.4% in the non problem funds. The multiplicity of potential indicators suggests that a multivariate comparison of the two groups of funds may be warranted, as pursued below.
For the trading violations, the rejection rates are significantly different from those of the non problem funds for four of the 12 performance flags -but in all cases the trading violations reject at lower rates. This result indicates that the performance flags are associated with activities that are related to fraud as opposed to violations of trading rules.
Prior hedge fund research has established a variety of important biases inherent in the self-reported returns contained in the commercially available databases, including the CISDM and TASS data we employ. Two of the most important are backfill bias and survivorship bias.
We include defunct funds in our study so survivorship bias is not a concern. Ordinarily backfill bias is mitigated by dropping the first 12 or 18 observations for a given fund as these may reflect unusually good performance. Our study focuses on peculiarities in reported returns and so we choose to include as many observations as possible. Nonetheless, it is interesting to see whether the patterns we identify are present in the full history of a fund as opposed to just its initial stage;
hence we recompute performance flags after dropping the first 12 observations of each fund's history. This reduces the number of funds that satisfy our minimum data requirements. Panel B
shows the results for the backfill-corrected sample. The results are qualitatively identical to those in Panel A, indicating that funds with reporting violations feature suspicious patterns beyond the first year of their histories.
We report in Table 6 the cross-sectional distribution of four of the patterns in returns underlying the performance flags with the highest rejection rates for the reporting violations. Panel B of Table 6 shows percentiles of the Maxrsq. At the median, non problem funds have a Maxrsq of 35.1% compared to just 20.4% for reporting violations. This is consistent with the result in Table 5 
B. Probability of a violation
We use probit analysis to assess the relation between performance flags and the incidence of subsequent SEC examinations or lawsuits. The dependent variable equals one for a violation and zero otherwise. The probit analysis provides three benefits. First, the multivariate setting allows us to determine which of the performance flags are more informative for measuring the risk of fraud. Second, the probit is a convenient method for assessing the additional explanatory power of the performance flags as a group relative to the operational risk variables studied in Brown et al. (2008 Brown et al. ( , 2009 ). Third, we can construct a scalar measure of the risk of fraud using the fitted value of the probit, taking into account the empirical relevance of each performance flag relative to the others.
The independent variables include the performance flags listed in Table 5 except for Switchrsq, # Pairs, and % Negative, each of which is highly correlated with at least one other flag. The # Zero, % Repeats, and String flags equal one when their test statistics reject the null at the 10% level and zero otherwise. For these variables, the marginal effect, which we label  prob, equals the increase in probability when the flag equals one. Maxrsq is the fund's maximum adjusted R-squared. Kink is the z-score of a discontinuity test. Indexrsq is the p-value of the slope coefficient from a regression of fund returns on a corresponding index. AR(1) and CAR (1) are z-scores from serial correlation coefficients. Uniform is the p-value of a test for a uniform distribution in the last digit of a fund's returns. For these variables,  prob equals the increase in probability for a one cross-sectional standard deviation increase in the independent variable. We also include each fund's average monthly return, volatility, and the natural log of a fund's maximum assets under management to determine whether the performance flags contribute incremental information beyond these summary statistics.
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From the univariate frequency analysis in Table 5 , we know that most of the flags are triggered at a higher rate for reporting violations than for non problem funds, and none of the flags are triggered at a higher rate for trading violations. Thus we expect ex-ante that more of the performance flags are significant in the probit analysis for the reporting violations than the trading violations.
In addition to the independent variables described above, we include a univariate measure Omega, our operational risk proxy, equals a fund's predicted probability from this model scaled by the unconditional probability of being a problem fund.
Results are displayed in Table 7 . We conduct the analysis four ways. In all cases we Here the unconditional probability of 10.67% is increased by 5.04% with a one standard deviation increase in Indexrsq and by 3.98% for a one standard deviation decrease in the Kink variable. Proportionately these increases are larger than in Panel A, indicating that after controlling for other fund attributes the flags are even more informative. For the trading violations, the only performance flag that is significant and the predicted sign is the Maxrsq flag.
For both the reporting violations and trading violations, the Omega variable is again significant, raising the unconditional probability of a violation by 4.00% and 4.49%, respectively.
The control group results in Panel B are important because they indicate that some of the performance flags contain information about a heightened risk of fraud even after controlling for other fund attributes. Hence the performance flags, notably Maxrsq, Indexrsq, and Kink, are not simply proxying for ordinary factors that might lead to greater scrutiny and hence higher rates of observed violations. Instead, they appear to contain incremental information regarding the behavior of some fund managers and the likelihood of subsequent charges.
As discussed in King and Zeng (2001) , the statistical properties of the probit model are heavily influenced by the mean of the dependent variable, which is the relative frequency of events in the sample. The coefficient bias and parameter instability normally associated with small samples remains an issue with much larger sample sizes when events are "rare." Since the full sample results in Table 7 involve a roughly 1% unconditional probability, we test for robustness using King and Zeng's rare events logistic regression. We find our results are qualitatively identical using this rare events procedure.
To create a scalar measure of the risk of fraud for each fund, we compute the f-score, which is the ratio of a fund's fitted probability of a violation, given the coefficient estimates in the probit analysis, to the unconditional probability. This metric, computed as in Dechow et al.
(2011), could be used by regulators as a single encompassing indicator of the probability of trouble and the need for an examination of the fund. In this analysis we first re-run the probit analysis after excluding the Omega variable to assess the ability of the performance flags alone to separate the problem funds from the non problem funds. Table 8 9 While the power may seem low, note that in practice the SEC uses a wide variety of variables to select funds for examination, so the f-score can be viewed as a supplement to the other signals used, such as complaints from investors or counter-parties. Moreover, combining our performance measures with operational risk proxies would further increase the magnitude of the f-scores for problem funds as implied by the significance of Omega in Table 7 .
C. Response of investors
The performance flags appear to help predict which funds subsequently are prosecuted by the SEC or are sued by investors. A related question is whether the flags are redundant because investors are already able to spot these funds through other means, for instance, through due diligence efforts that focus on other information, such as the presence of operational flags discussed in Brown et al. (2008) . To answer this question, we examine the response of investors to performance, and whether this sensitivity differs across the problem funds and non problem funds. As argued by Brown et al., if investors are already able to identify funds with a higher risk of future legal trouble, we might expect good performance by problem funds to attract less capital than good performance by non problem funds.
The flow-performance regressions are similar to those in Sirri and Tufano (1998), also adopted in Brown et al. (2008) , in which annual percentage flow is calculated as the change in assets under management after controlling for fund returns. To measure performance, each year we sort funds into percentiles using raw returns relative to funds in the same style. We estimate the relation between performance and flows using a piecewise linear specification with four performance variables based on fund percentiles. We only include observations of flows and returns for problem funds in the years prior to the filing date of the SEC enforcement actions or lawsuits. We also include interaction terms equal to the product of each performance variable and an indicator that equals one if a fund is in the problem fund subsample and zero otherwise.
These interaction terms measure the difference between the flow-performance sensitivity of problem funds and non problem funds. We use prior year log fund size, return volatility, and flow, as well as contemporaneous average flow to the fund's style group, incentive fee, and The coefficients on the performance variables are all positive, and all are significant at the 1% level. Their magnitudes indicate that above-median returns are rewarded with inflows at a higher rate than below-median returns are punished by outflows: the best performing fund has performance-related inflows equal to about 54% of fund assets whereas the worst performing fund has outflows equal to about 38% of fund assets. These results indicate an approximately linear relation between performance and subsequent fund flow after controlling for known determinants.
The main finding of this analysis is that investors do not appear to treat problem and non problem funds differently prior to the violations. Performance coefficients are the same for reporting and trading violations. More importantly, coefficients on all interaction terms are insignificant. That is, the sensitivity of investors to performance is the same for non problem funds and funds that are subsequently prosecuted by the SEC or the subject of investor lawsuits.
This result suggests that investors either choose to disregard the heightened risk of subsequent legal trouble, or are unaware of it, indicating that predictors such as the performance flags developed in this paper contain new information.
IV. Conclusion
Recent cases of hedge fund fraud have prompted revisions to the SEC Investment Advisers Act requiring more advisers to register. In the past, opponents of a registration requirement argued that additional regulation would act as a hollow promise of safety, since agencies such as the SEC do not have adequate resources to conduct a sufficient number of examinations to prevent and deter fraudulent activity. The goal of this paper is to test whether low-cost pre-screens based on suspicious patterns in returns are effective in predicting which funds are subsequently charged with legal or regulatory violations.
We determine whether each fund in a large sample triggers one or more performance flags based on the fund's time series of reported returns. Funds subsequently prosecuted for reporting violations trigger the flags at a substantially higher frequency than other funds, suggesting that pre-screens based on suspicious patterns in returns may be effective predictors of hedge fund fraud. In a probit analysis, we find a statistically and economically significant association between the incidence of a reporting violation and several performance flags. Since we include a proxy for operational risk as an additional determinant, our results suggest that performance flags may be a useful complement operational risk measures, such as those studied
by Brown et al. (2008) and Dimmock and Gerken (2009).
Though our paper reveals a strong relation between the existence of suspicious patterns in a hedge fund's returns and the probability of a subsequent legal or regulatory action, the analysis has been limited to a study of past violations. Naturally, investors and regulators are more concerned about the ability to predict future trouble. One important caveat regarding the association between performance flags and fraud risk is related to the Lucas (1976) critique of macro-economic policy research. Historical associations may not persist following the implementation of a new rule or target if behavior is affected. Performance flags will provide valuable information in the future only if the reporting behavior we study persists. There are at least two reasons why one might expect this to occur. First, conversations with SEC staff confirm that the SEC uses a wide variety of information sources, including patterns in returns, but that the reasons leading to an examination never have to be revealed. Hence it is unclear that fund managers will ever learn which performance flags were relevant. Second, many of the performance flags result from managerial incentives to shape the distribution of fund returns in order to attract and maintain investors. Those managers who purposefully misreport to appease their investor base may not cease even if it raises the chance of an examination -if they do then at least the performance flags served the purpose of providing a deterrent to future abuse.
Our study indicates that the risk of fraud can be successfully measured using widely available return data. This evidence supports regulatory oversight of the hedge fund industry.
More generally, our results suggest that required disclosure of financial records can aid in the detection of fraud risk using quantitative methods. Depicted are three histograms of monthly hedge fund returns using 101 bins centered on the first bin to the right of zero and labeled "0." Bold vertical bars indicate the two bins bracketing zero. Figure 1A includes returns of 8,575 funds which are not in a sample of funds subject to SEC examinations or lawsuits. Figure 1B includes returns of 79 funds charged with misappropriation, overvaluation, misrepresentation, or Ponzi schemes. Figure 1C includes returns of 112 funds charged with violating short sale rules, insider trading, or other offenses. Bin sizes are 17bp, 16bp, and 35bp, respectively. Figure 1A . Non Problem Funds Figure 1B . Reporting Violations Figure 1C . Listed are percentiles of six tests for data quality: "# Zero" is the number of returns exactly equal to zero, "% Repeat" is the percentage of returns that are repeated at least once, "Uniform" is a chi-squared statistic testing whether the last reported digit is uniformly distributed, "String" is the maximum length of a sequence of identical returns, "# Pairs" is the number of pairs of repeated returns, and "% Negative" is the percentage of returns below zero. Panel A shows results for a 60 month history, with returns that are generated from a scaled t-distribution with excess kurtosis of 3, annual mean of 10% and volatility 15%, and reported to the nearest .0001%. Panel B shows results for a 120 month history, with returns that are generated from a scaled t-distribution with excess kurtosis of 3, annual mean of 5% and volatility of 10%, and reported to the nearest 0.1%. For "# Zero" and "% Negative" the percentiles are computed analytically. For "% Repeat," "String," and "# Pairs" bootstrap percentiles are established by simulating 10,000 series of returns which are then rounded to the appropriate precision. Listed are summary statistics of hedge funds in our sample. The summary statistics are the equally-weighted cross-sectional averages of: the mean monthly return, ; the standard deviation of monthly returns, ; the Sharpe ratio, SR; the skewness, Skew; the excess kurtosis, Kurt; the expected short-fall based on a 5%
threshold, ES; the first-order serial correlation coefficient, AR(1); and the percentage of funds with a positive and statistically significant first-order serial correlation coefficient, %>>0. Panel A shows results for the subsample of funds that are the subject of SEC enforcement actions or lawsuits. Panel B shows the results for all other funds. In Panel B the symbols "***", "**", and "*" indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, for a test that the corresponding averages in Panel A and B are different. Panels C and E show results for reporting violations and trading violations, respectively, with results from their control groups in Panels D and F. In Panels D and F the symbols "***", "**", and "*" indicate a significance difference between the violations and their control group. is triggered by a high number of returns exactly equal to zero. "% Repeat" is triggered by a high number of returns that are repeated. "Uniform" is triggered by a distribution of the last digit of returns that is significantly different from a uniform distribution. "String" is triggered by a long string of repeated returns. "# Pairs" is triggered by a high number of pairs of repeated returns. "% Negative" is triggered by a low number of negative returns. "AR(1)" is triggered by a statistically significant and positive first-order serial correlation coefficient. "CAR(1)" is triggered by a larger serial correlation conditioned on a negative lagged fitted value from a regression involving an optimal set of style factors. "Maxrsq" and "Switchrsq" are triggered by an adjusted R-squared that is not significantly different from zero. "Indexrsq" is triggered by an insignificant relation between a fund and its category peers. "Kink" is triggered by a discontinuity at zero in the distribution of a hedge fund's returns. The p-values are from tests for a difference between the rejection frequencies of non problem funds and the other groups. "***", "**", and "*" indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Table 7 . Probit Analysis.
Listed are results of four probit analyses relating fund attributes to the incidence of reporting or trading violations. Panel A compares violations to all non problem funds. Panel B compares violations to a set of control funds. Violations include 56 funds accused of a reporting violation, consisting of misappropriation, overvaluation, misrepresentation, or Ponzi schemes, and 54 funds accused of a trading violation, involving short sale rules, insider trading, or any other offense. The dependent variable equals one for funds with a violation and zero otherwise. The independent variables are fund attributes and test statistics. "Avg Return" and "Volatility" are computed from monthly returns. "Maxrsq" is the fund's maximum adjusted R-squared. "Kink" is the z-score of a test for a discontinuity at zero in the distribution of a hedge fund's returns. "Indexrsq" is the p-value of the slope coefficient from a regression of fund returns on a corresponding style index. "AR(1)" is the z-score of a fund's first-order serial correlation coefficient. "CAR(1)" is the z-score of a fund's incremental first-order serial correlation following poor returns. "# Zero" equals one if a fund has too many returns exactly equal to zero. "Uniform" is the p-value of a test for a uniform distribution in a fund's last digit of returns. "% Repeat" equals one if a fund has too many returns that are repeated. "String" equals one if a fund has too long a string of repeated returns. "Size" is the natural log of a fund's maximum assets under management. "Omega" measures operational risk. The "# Zero," "% Repeat," "String," and "% Negative" tests are evaluated at the 10% significance level. For these tests, "prob" equals the increase in probability when the variable equals one. For other independent variables, "prob" equals the increase in probability for a one standard deviation increase in the independent variable. "***", "**", and "*" indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Table 8 . f-scores.
Listed is the percentage of hedge funds by f-score, defined as the ratio of conditional probability to unconditional probability of a subsequent violation. Conditional probabilities are computed for each fund using the fitted values from a probit analysis. Panel A shows results comparing violations to the full sample of non problem funds, whereas Panel B compares violations to a control group. In both cases reporting violations, including misappropriation, overvaluation, misrepresentation, or Ponzi schemes, are analyzed separately from trading violations, involving short sale rules, insider trading, or any other offense. Three levels of f-score are assessed: those corresponding to the 95 th and 90 th percentile of non problem funds and 1.00, which occurs when the conditional probability equals the unconditional probability. 
